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Abstract
As embedded systems become more connected and more ubiquitous in mission- and safety-critical
systems, embedded devices have become a high-value target for hackers and security researchers.
Attacks on real-time embedded systems software can put lives in danger and put our critical in-
frastructure at risk. Despite this, security techniques for embedded systems have not been widely
studied. Many existing software security techniques for general purpose computers rely on assump-
tions that do not hold in the embedded case. This thesis focuses on one such technique, control-flow
integrity (CFI), that has been vetted as an effective countermeasure against control-flow hijacking
attacks on general purpose computing systems. Without the process isolation and fine-grained
memory protections provided by a general purpose computer with a rich operating system, CFI
cannot provide any security guarantees. This thesis explores a way to use CFI on ARM Cortex-R
devices running minimal real-time operating systems. We provide techniques for protecting runtime
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Modern real-time embedded systems have countless applications, varying in complexity. There are
simple devices like thermostats or coffee makers, more complex systems like smartphone radios,
and highly complex health and safety critical systems like jet engine controllers or automotive
braking controllers. In safety critical systems especially, there is great risk when manufacturers
release faulty devices. Failures in these systems can cause injury, and the designers of the system
will be held liable [4]. Often these faults are in software and can be exploited by an intelligent
adversary [5,6].
The most pernicious type of attack allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a device.
Such attacks, commonly called control-flow hijacking, manipulate the execution of a program by
redirecting control-flow transfers to either attacker-supplied code (e.g., stack smashing [7]) or useful
code sequences already in the program (e.g., return-oriented programming [8]). State-of-the-art
defenses against control-flow hijacking are largely based on the concept of control-flow integrity
(CFI) [9]. Intuitively, CFI compares the behavior of a running program to a predefined model.
If the program’s behavior deviates from what is expected, an error is thrown. In particular, CFI
monitors control-flow transfers and only allows a transfer if it is accepted by a precomputed control-
flow graph (CFG) of the program. CFI is a subset of a larger category of security techniques called
memory safety. While full memory safety is possible, the performance overhead (nearly 200% in
some cases) makes it impractical for most applications [10,11]. CFI is an approach to memory safety
on a small subset of memory, namely code pointers, which allows for significantly lower overhead
as opposed to full memory safety.
While myriad CFI implementations exist for general-purpose systems (e.g., desktops and smart-
phones), real-time embedded systems present several unique challenges for CFI. First, many em-
bedded systems do not have the hardware or software support for task isolation. Such isolation
is common in general-purpose systems and relied upon by existing CFI solutions. Second, the
scheduler in a real-time operating system (RTOS) can interrupt any instruction and can return to
any arbitrary instruction. This makes the scheduler a high degree node in the CFG, which Carlini
et al. have shown severely weakens the effectiveness of CFI [12]. Third, the majority of existing
CFI solutions are for x86-based hardware, while embedded systems are commonly ARM-based, an
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architecture which has several challenges for CFI, such as multiple instruction sets and the lack of
a dedicated function return instruction. Finally, real-time embedded systems generally have lim-
ited resources and strict timing requirements, limiting the amount of storage available for runtime
structures required for CFI (e.g., shadow stacks). CFI instrumentation must adhere to the timing
constraints in place by the real-time system.
We propose a CFI scheme for real-time embedded systems that addresses these challenges and
prevents control-flow hijacking attacks. For our initial efforts, we focus on ARM-based systems run-
ning the FreeRTOS real-time operating system, but we anticipate that our system will be portable
to any RTOS running on an ARM microcontroller, since the majority of the implementation is de-
signed to be operating system agnostic. Existing approaches to CFI on embedded systems, such as
C-FLAT [13] and TrackOS [14], move away from the traditional CFI approach but introduce new
time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerabilities. Traditional approaches depend on process isolation
in the presence of multiple threads, but most embedded systems do not have this isolation. Our
work takes a more traditional approach to CFI, while adding the necessary protections to support
multiple threads without true isolation using virtual memory. The contributions of this work are:
• Protection mechanisms for runtime data structures used by CFI. We protect the
instrumentation required for CFI as well as the shadow stack, which is used to augment the
CFG at runtime.
• Binary instrumentation for ARM. We create a reference implementation for ARM-based
embedded systems running the FreeRTOS real-time operating system.
• Technique for process isolation on ARM systems without virtual memory. We
devise a low-overhead method for isolating critical parts of a process on ARM systems where
all processes run in the same address space.
• A binary patching implementation for ARM. We create a binary patching framework
that allows scripting modification of precompiled ARM binaries to add features like CFI.
1.1 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is formatted as follows. Chapter 2 contains background information
about ARM, CFI, and real-time operating systems. Chapter 3 describes our reference implementa-
tion for single-threaded, bare metal ARM systems. Chapter 4 describes the modifications made to
FreeRTOS to support our bare metal implementation across multiple processes in the same address
space. Chapter 5 evaluates the security and performance overhead of our CFI schemes. Finally,
Chapter 6 summarizes this work and concludes the thesis.
2
Chapter 2
Background and Related Works
Before we can discuss the low-level details of control-flow integrity instrumentation on embedded
ARM processors, we discuss the relevant background and related works which this thesis builds
upon. We start with a brief overview of the embedded real-time ARM architecture, Cortex-R.
Then, we discuss control-flow integrity, its variants, and its limitations. Finally, we explore some of
the basic principles of real-time operating systems (RTOS), specifically FreeRTOS and the relevant
differences between FreeRTOS and general purpose operating system kernels like Linux.
2.1 ARM Architecture
The ARM architecture is unique in how flexible it is. There are ARM chips designed for general
purpose systems called the Application Profile (Cortex-A), high performance real-time systems
called the Real-time Profile (Cortex-R), and low-power embedded systems called the Microcontroller
Profile (Cortex-M). While all three of these profiles share a similar instruction set architecture (ISA),
the underlying hardware is different to support different requirements. Cortex-A systems are often
multi-core with high clock speeds, and they have all of the necessary hardware to efficiently run
general purpose operating systems. Cortex-R processors are generally single core (although the
more expensive models are multi-core), and they have special interrupt controllers and caching
mechanisms to support the low-latency required by real-time systems. Cortex-M processors are
single-core, with hardware designed for minimal power usage and security.
Table 2.1 highlights more of the differences between the different ARM lineups. In addition to
belonging to ARM Cortex-A/R/M, ARM processors can be refined further based on the version of
the architecture they support. At the time of this writing, modern ARM cores are either ARMv7
or ARMv8, with ARMv8 being widely adopted for Cortex-A models, while the ARMv8 versions
of Cortex-R and Cortex-M processors have been announced. ARMv8 for Cortex-R (abbreviated
ARMv8-R) introduces a new hypervisor mode that allows use of multiple real-time operating sys-
tems as well as efficient process isolation. While this feature could be highly beneficial for security
purposes, these processors have not been made available yet, the remainder of this paper will be fo-
cusing on the ARMv7-R architecture. When ARMv8-R becomes more widely available, we believe
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Architecture Bit-width Profile Features
ARMv7-A 32 Application Multiple cores, MMU, TrustZone
ARMv8-A 32/64 Application Multiple cores, 64-bit support, MMU, TrustZone,
hardware-accelerated cryptography
ARMv7-R 32 Real-time Single- or multi-core, tightly coupled caching, MPU,
real-time clock
ARMv8-R 32 Real-time Single- or multi-core, tightly coupled caching, MPU,
real-time clock, optional virtual memory, bare-metal
hypervisor mode
ARMv7-M 32 Microcontroller Single-core, low-power, Thumb2 ISA only, MPU
ARMv8-M 32 Microcontroller Single-core, low-power, Thumb2 ISA only, MPU,
TrustZone-M
Table 2.1: ARM processors and their features [2]
that the hypervisor mode will strengthen the security benefits this work provides (see Section 5.3.1
for more details).
Even after the release of ARMv8-R, the current ARMv7-R devices will still be in use. It would be
impractical and expensive for manufacturers to replace all existing ARMv7-R hardware. Firmware
updates, on devices that support them, are a much more practical way to add new features or fix
bugs.
2.1.1 ARM/Thumb/Thumb2 Instruction Sets
Unlike other common architectures, ARM chips can operate on several different instruction sets.
Most modern ARM cores support the ARM, Thumb, Thumb2, and ThumbEE ISAs. Some older
ARM cores also support the Jazelle DBX (Direct Bytecode eXectution), which provides hardware
support for executing Java bytecode. Additionally, ARM provides a standard interface for inter-
acting with coprocessors such as hardware floating point units and the ARM Memory Protection
Unit (MPU). Because our work exists mostly at the assembly language and machine code level, we
need an understanding of the low level details of the ARM instruction set.
All ARM devices have 16 32-bit registers (R0-R15) and two status registers. Of the 16 32-bit
registers, 4 have special purposes. R15 is reserved for use as the program counter (PC), R14 is the
link register (LR), R13 is the stack pointer (SP), and R12 is the intra-procedure-call scratch reg-
ister (IP). By convention, R0-R3 are used for function arguments, R4-R11 are used for temporary
variables, and R0 is used for function return values. Registers R0-R7 are called the Lo registers,
and R8-R15 are called the Hi registers. The Hi registers cannot be accessed by most 16-bit Thumb
instructions, but they can be accessed by 32-bit Thumb instructions. All registers can be accessed
from the ARM instruction set. The current program status register (CPSR) contains flags repre-
senting the current processing mode and status bits for conditional operations. The saved program
status register (SPSR) is used during exception handling to restore the CPSR upon returning to
normal processing.
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Mode Shared Registers Banked Registers
System & User R0-R15, CPSR None
FIQ R0-R7, CPSR R8-R15, SPSR
Supervisor R0-R12, CPSR R13-R14, SPSR
Abort R0-R12, CPSR R13-R14, SPSR
IRQ R0-R12, CPSR R13-R14, SPSR
Undefined R0-R12, CPSR R13-R14, SPSR
Table 2.2: Register sets for ARM processing modes [3]
The ARM Procedure Call Standard [15] dictates that ARM subroutines must preserve the
values of R4-R11 and LR. This means that if the subroutine calls any other subroutines using the
branch-and-link instruction, it must push LR to the stack before the subroutine call.
2.1.2 Processing Modes
ARM processors can have up to nine different processing modes. On Cortex-R processors, there
are only seven processing modes: User, System, Supervisor, Interrupt, Fast Interrupt, Abort, and
Undefined. User and System modes are normal processing modes, while the other five modes are
different types of exception states. In this section, we describe the main characteristics of these
modes. Many of the registers are shared between modes, but there are some exceptions where
the processing mode has its own banked registers that do not interfere with the registers in other
modes. The banked registers for each mode are shown in Table 2.2. Our work depends on various
ARM processing modes to perform operations at different privilege levels. Specifically, we use User,
System, Supervisor, and IRQ mode.
User and System mode are similar, except System mode runs in a privileged state, allowing it
to access regions of memory marked as privileged-only by the MPU. Unlike the other states, the
majority of processing should be performed in either User or System mode.
When an ARM processor boots, the first code that executes is the reset routine. In the reset
routine, the processor mode is set to Supervisor mode, which is a privileged mode that is designed
for use as kernel mode for an operating system. Additionally, supervisor mode is used when
handling a software interrupt (svc) instruction. This instruction can be used to implement system
calls that need elevated privileges. Supervisor mode, along with all of the other exception modes,
has a banked stack pointer register (SP svc), link register (LR svc), and saved program status
register (SPSR svc). These allow Supervisor mode to have its own stack, while also preventing
it from modifying the previous mode’s link register. The banked registers cannot be accessed by
other processing modes. The SPSR is used to restore the previous program status upon exiting the
exception state.
When external hardware generates an interrupt request, the processor will handle the interrupt
in either Interrupt or Fast Interrupt Mode. Like Supervisor mode, both interrupt modes have
banked SP, LR, and SPSR registers. The main difference between FIQ and IRQ modes is that FIQ
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Figure 2.1: Simplified memory map for RM46L852 processor [1]
mode also has its own banked R8-R12, which means the FIQ service routine can use these registers
for processing without saving them to the stack first. This allows FIQ requests to be handled much
faster, which has various uses for fast data transfers or other tasks that need low latency responses.
FIQ mode is also the only mode that can interrupt IRQ mode by default.
There are two kinds of aborts in ARM, prefetch aborts and data aborts. Prefetch aborts occur
when the processor attempts to execute an instruction after a failed instruction fetch. This will
occur when the processor tries to fetch an instruction from memory that is not executable, such as
peripheral registers or regions marked non-executable by the MPU. Data aborts occur when the
processor attempts to read or write data to memory that the memory system does not allow. In
particular, this would include an attempt to write to flash memory from the CPU or an attempt
to write to privileged memory from User Mode. In a general purpose operating system, an abort
would likely result in a segmentation fault. In an embedded context, the default action is to enter
an infinite loop or reset the CPU. Abort mode can be used in debugging, since the default handler
will allow the developer to view the register state, while LR abt will indicate which instruction
caused the abort.
The final mode that ARMv7-R processors can use is Undefined mode. This mode is entered
when the processor attempts to execute an opcode that it does not recognize. The intuition behind
this exception state is to allow developers to implement instructions entirely in software, albeit at
a high performance cost. For example, if a compiler does not support a certain coprocessor, the
Undefined exception could allow the programmer to still use that coprocessor in a generic way.
6
2.1.3 Memory
All modern ARMv7 processors have a 32-bit address space. The layout of this memory is manufac-
turer and processor dependent, but in general, there are three important sections: non-volatile flash
memory, volatile RAM, and memory-mapped peripheral registers. Flash memory stores program
code and constants, and it may be used for non-volatile storage of data between reboots, although
special procedures are required to write to flash memory. RAM is used for all volatile storage and
may be used for executable code, if allowed by the Memory Protection Unit (MPU). The periph-
eral registers are used to configure various hardware on the chip, such as timers, analog-to-digital
converters, and direct memory access controllers. All of these regions of memory exist in the same
address space. Without protections, these regions could be exploited by an attacker to perform
arbitrary read and write operations.
The reference system used for this work is a Texas Instruments Hercules RM46L852, an ARM
Cortex-R4F processor. The full memory map for this processor is shown in Figure 2.1. We can see
that this processor has 1.25 MB of non-volatile program flash, 192 KB of RAM, and an additional
64 KB of flash for emulated EEPROM storage. These three sections of actual memory do not
fill up the entire 32-bit address space. Some of the additional sections include memory-mapped
peripherals, mirrored images of flash, and reserved sections that may be used internally by the
processor or not used at all.
Each of the sections of this address space has hardware limitations as to whether or not they can
be written, read, or executed. Some sections will cause aborts, while others may just have no effect
when trying to read or write. For more fine-grained memory permissions, most ARM Cortex-M
and Cortex-R processors come with a Memory Protection Unit (MPU). The MPU enables setting
up permissions for up to 12 regions of memory. For each region, there are three sets of permissions
to be set: user mode access, privileged mode access, and execute permissions. For example, a
region can be configured to be read-only for user mode, read and write for privileged mode, and
non-executable (in any mode). Our work depends heavily on the MPU to create some isolation
between privileged and non-privileged modes. MPU regions can be split into 8 subregions, where
each subregion can be selectively disabled or enabled. Additionally, the main regions can overlap;
the overlapped region will take on the permissions of the highest priority region. MPU violations
result in a data abort, allowing the processor to reset or perform some kind of error correction.
While not as powerful as a full memory management unit, the MPU can be used to set up some
separation between user mode and kernel mode, although it was designed more as a safety feature
than a security feature.
2.2 Control-Flow Integrity
Control-flow integrity (CFI) defends against control-flow hijacking attacks by ensuring that a given
program follows a precomputed model of execution, called a control-flow graph (CFG). The intuition
behind CFI is that if we are able to protect indirect control flow transfers, that is, any change in
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control flow computed at runtime, we prevent arbitrary code execution. Unlike other memory
safety techniques [10,11], CFI is fast and each CFI check runs in constant time. In the remainder
of this section, we discuss the intricacies of CFI, including the general implementation details and
existing variants of CFI.
2.2.1 Threat Model
CFI schemes attempt to prevent exploitation under a powerful attacker model. The attacker is
able to modify anything in writeable memory, including any data on the stack, heap, or in global
memory. The attacker cannot, however, modify any read-only memory. Specifically, the attacker
cannot modify program code, which is a common assumption, since most operating systems mark
the program code section as being only readable and executable. Additionally, for CFI to be secure,
an attacker must not be able to execute from any writeable memory.
The attacker’s goal is to subvert the expected control flow of a program by modifying code
pointers stored in memory or registers. A code pointer is any pointer that points to executable
code. A function pointer is a type of code pointer. By modifying a code pointer, the attacker is
modifying the target of an indirect branch instruction, which is any branch instruction where the
target is calculated at runtime, rather than being statically inserted by the compiler. In ARM, an
indirect branch is one of two kinds of instructions: (1) a branch instruction with a register operand,
or (2) any operation with the program counter (PC) register as the destination. These instructions
are enumerated in Table 2.3.
2.2.2 How CFI Works
All CFI schemes depend on two components: a control-flow graph (CFG) and binary instrumenta-
tion. Additionally, secure CFI schemes require a protected shadow call stack [12]. CFI implemen-
tations must accomplish three tasks:
1. From the CFG, extract a labeling scheme for all indirect jump targets.
2. At each indirect jump target in the binary, insert a label.
3. At each indirect jump instruction, insert instrumentation that ensures the jump target con-
tains the expected label.
Assume for now that we have a CFG (we will discuss generating the CFG later). The CFG
is a directed graph where the nodes represent basic blocks in a program, and the edges represent
legal control-flow transfers from one basic block to another. Most of the nodes will be the source
of one or two edges, since the majority of control-flow modifying instructions are direct calls or
conditional branches, which have one or two possible targets. However, when a basic block ends in
an indirect call or branch, there are often many possible targets for that control-flow transfer. The
CFG generation algorithm will hopefully have reduced the total number of possible targets for that
instruction. Each of the targets for that indirect branch are considered equal in the labeling scheme.
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Mnemonic Instruction Description
bx Rm Branch and exchange Branch to target address Rm, and exchange in-
struction set based on least significant bit (LSB)
of Rm. If LSB is set, switch to Thumb mode, else
switch to ARM mode
blx Rm Branch, link, and ex-
change
Branch to target address Rm, set link register, and
exchange instruction set based on LSB of Rm
ldm{mode} Rm{!},
reglist
Load multiple Load into registers in reglist, starting at address
in Rm. If Rm! is specified, write back the final
address into Rm. Mode specifies the addressing
order: ia (increment after), ib (increment before),
da (decrement after), db (decrement before). The
pseudo instruction ldmfd is for loading from a
full-descending stack. It is the same as ldmia.
pop reglist Pop from stack Same as ldmfd sp!, reglist
rfe Rn{!} Return from exception Pop PC and CPSR off of the stack pointer spec-
ified by Rn to return from an exception state. If
Rn! is specified, write back new stack top to Rn.







Figure 2.2: Example CFG of a sorting function
In general, a unique label is selected for each set of targets that has the same set of sources. This
effectively results in a more permissive enforced CFG, but many CFI schemes take this approach
because it offers improved performance, allowing label checks to be performed in constant time.
For example, imagine a sorting function that takes as an argument a pointer to a function that
will perform the comparison between two elements. A possible CFG for this function is shown in
Figure 2.2. The inner loop will call either the lt or gt function. Since these two blocks have the
same source block, they would be given the same label for CFI instrumentation.
There are two goals to CFI instrumentation: (1) inserting label checks at all indirect control-
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flow transfers, and (2) labeling all possible indirect jump targets. To do this, every indirect jump
is replaced with a few assembly instructions that attempt to read a label from some constant offset
from the branch target address. The instrumentation then compares the label read from memory
with a hardcoded label. If the labels match, the instrumentation continues with the original branch.
If they do not match, then the code either jumps to some error handling code or exits, depending
on the use case. In the case of an embedded system, the crash would be a good opportunity to
safely shut down the system, preventing a control-flow violation from resulting in damage to an
entity in the physical world.
The labels for CFI instrumentation must be chosen carefully. If the label appears coincidentally
anywhere else in memory (except for a valid jump target), an attacker could circumvent CFI by
overwriting a code pointer with an address that is the correct offset from the location where the label
appears. Since an indirect jump may have multiple legal targets, this means that even a correct
stateless CFI implementation may allow jumps that were not intended by the programmer. We will
discuss this limitation further in Section 2.2.5. The other condition that each label must satisfy is
that it should be side-effect free. Since the label is stored in executable code, the instrumentation
should either ensure that the label is never executed, or it should be a side-effect free instruction.
In the original CFI implementation, the x86 prefetch instruction was used to encode the label [9].
Another indirect jump that CFI instrumentation needs to handle differently is function returns.
Unlike indirect calls, where there may be multiple targets, most functions should always return
to their callsite. With a few exceptions, return addresses are stored on the stack, and can be
overwritten by buffer overflows or other memory corruption techniques. To combat this, we instead
store return addresses in a separate shadow stack in protected memory. The shadow stack should
not be writeable except during the function prologue and epilogue. Unlike the other components
of CFI, the shadow stack is not static. It is a dynamic component that enhances the precision of
the CFG at runtime.
This section described the basic concepts behind implementing CFI. For a more concrete
implementation example for ARM processors, see Chapter 3.
2.2.3 CFI Variations
Since the original CFI publication in 2005, several variations of CFI have emerged. Some of
these variations trade security for speed, while others may forgo exploit prevention to increase the
probability of exploit detection.
The original CFI design can be described as forward-edge CFI with a shadow stack. Forward-
edge CFI refers to the instrumentation of indirect calls and branches to constrain the number of
possible targets. A purely forward-edge CFI approach would either ignore function returns (the
backward-edge), or it would treat each return like another indirect branch. In the former case, all
return address corruption attacks would be possible. In the latter case, an attacker would be able
to use a function called from multiple locations as a way to make the control-flow jump between the
various callsites of the function. The shadow stack ensures that functions return to their callsite,
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although this can degrade performance by adding a dynamic element to CFI.
Apart from choosing how to protect the backward-edge, another way that CFI implementations
can vary is in their control-flow graph. CFG generation in the presence of indirect branches is an
unsolved problem, since resolving indirect branches is believed to be as hard as pointer analysis.
As a result, CFGs used to create the labeling scheme for CFI are imprecise. Because of this, and
for performance reasons, some CFI approaches use a coarse-grained CFG. Instead of attempting
to resolve all indirect branches targets, a coarse-grained CFG may adopt a simple policy for branch
targets. For example, a coarse-grained policy for return instructions would be that the instruction
preceding the return address is a call instruction. For function calls, a coarse-grained policy could be
that the function at the target address matches the return type and argument types of the function
pointer. While coarse-grained CFGs are simpler to generate and can make instrumentation faster,
is has been shown that coarse-grained policies are not secure [12].
Fine-grained CFGs, by contrast, attempt to resolve indirect jumps to the smallest set of legal
jump targets. Due to the difficulty of pointer analysis, fine-grained approaches, we cannot construct
a fully-precise CFG. A fully-precise CFG is both complete and sound. For an individual node in
the CFG, a complete analysis will not include any branch targets that are not actually taken by the
program, and a sound analysis will always accept a legal branch target. In other words, completeness
refers to eliminating false positives, while soundness refers to eliminating false negatives. False
positives reduce security, while false negatives could break program functionality.
The CFG is a static component of CFI. Because it is precomputed and stateless, it makes CFI
instrumentation faster and more deterministic with good cache locality. Unfortunately, even if we
could create a fully-precise CFG, the overall precision of CFI could still be increased with knowledge
of program state. This is where dynamic elements like shadow stacks can be used to enhance the
security guarantees of CFI, at the cost of performance. While shadow stacks are a simple solution
to protect function returns, normal indirect branches with a large target set could be exploited to
branch to an unexpected location given the current program state. These kinds of branches are
called dispatchers and they could allow attackers to perform return-oriented programming (ROP)
attacks, where useful sequences of existing instructions are chained together by return instructions
and a maliciously crafted stack. Each sequence of instructions is called a gadget, and gadgets
are linked together in ROP chains to perform more complex computation. Some of the proposed
CFI schemes reduce the effectiveness of dispatchers by using more program context. For example,
some schemes record multiple control flow transfers, and periodically compare the resulting paths
against the CFG. While this can result in a more precise measurement of control flow, it can allow
an exploit to occur before detection, which may be undesirable depending on the application.
With all of these variations in mind, the theoretical golden standard of CFI is fully-precise CFI
with a shadow stack. If we were able to create a sound and complete CFG, this variation would
provide the best tradeoff between security and performance, since control flow cannot be exploited,
label checks and the shadow stack have low overhead compared to more dynamic approaches.
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Original CFI [9] binCFI [16] Modular CFI [17] MoCFI [18] KCoFI [19] C-FLAT [13] TrackOS [14]
Prevent Exploit Y Y Y Y Y N N
Detect Exploit Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Forward-edge Inline Inline Inline Inline Inline Record Record
Backward-edge Shadow stack Inline Inline Inline Inline Record Record
Granularity Fine Fine Fine Fine Coarse Fine Fine
Static/Dynamic Both Static Static Both Static Dynamic Dynamic
Architecture x86 x86 x86 ARM x86 ARM AVR
AIR 99.13% [16] 98.86% [16] 99.99% [17] Unknown 98.18% [19] Unknown Unknown
Table 2.4: Different CFI implementations and their features
2.2.4 Existing CFI Implementations
All of the variations discussed in Section 2.2.3 have been used in one or more CFI implementations.
Table 2.4 highlights some of the CFI schemes relevant to this work and shows some of the defining
features.
The original CFI proposal is a fine-grained approach with a shadow stack. Much of the theory
behind CFI has not changed, and the original proposal remains one of the most secure and efficient
variants today. The reference implementation actually took more of a coarse-grained approach,
but the researchers identified that a more restrictive CFG would be more secure. This scheme was
originally developed for 32-bit Windows XP, and has since been adopted by Microsoft as a compiler
option called Control Flow Guard, which was introduced in Windows 8.1.
More recent CFI schemes are designed to work on precompiled binaries in the presence of
dynamic linking. One of these implementations, binCFI [16], achieves similar security to the original
CFI implementation without relying on relocation information from the compiler. One of the
important outcomes of that work was a new metric for describing the precision of the control-flow
graph: average indirect target reduction (AIR). The intuition behind the metric is that without
CFI, an indirect branch can target any instruction, and the CFG reduces the size of the target
set for each indirect branch. Equation 2.1 shows how AIR is calculated, where n is the number of
indirect branches, Tj is the set of calculated targets for indirect branch j, and S is the number of











While AIR is not a perfect metric for evaluating CFI, it provides us with a quantitative mea-
surement that gives us a way to sanity check our implementation. Acceptable AIR values are
usually around 99% for a fine-grained practical implementation, while an extremely coarse-grained
implementation (such as limiting indirect branches to any valid instruction boundary), could see
an AIR of about 80%, depending on the architecture.
The majority of CFI schemes were developed for the x86 architecture. With mobile devices
becoming more ubiquitous, some security research efforts, including CFI research, moved towards
targeting the ARM architecture. Two of the first CFI schemes for ARM, MoCFI [18] and Control-
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flow Restrictor [20] were developed for Apple iOS devices. These CFI schemes identified and
overcame some of the challenges associated with developing a CFI scheme on an ARM-based system.
The main architectural challenges for CFI on ARM include:
• No dedicated return instruction
• Instructions can operate on the program counter
• Multiple instruction sets in a single binary
The original ARM CFI implementations only targeted iOS smartphones, but with the rise of the
Internet of Things, ARM devices with no operating systems became more relevant. These embedded
systems have qualities that make CFI a good potential hardening technique. For example, programs
running without an operating system have no dynamic linking, which simplifies CFG generation.
Additionally, some of the newer ARM Cortex-A and Cortex-M devices are shipping with a trusted
execution environment called TrustZone, which could be used for measurement and attestation.
Control Flow Attestation (C-FLAT) does exactly this; it leverages ARM TrustZone to implement
a CFI scheme designed for embedded systems without operating systems [13]. Unlike traditional
CFI, C-FLAT’s instrumentation does not perform jump target checking. Rather, it records control-
flow events, and periodically verifies the validity of each path from within a secure environment.
Unfortunately, this dynamic approach introduces time-of-use to time-of-check vulnerabilities. C-
FLAT will detect a control-flow violation, but it may not detect it until after malicious code has
executed.
As we move on to discuss CFI on real-time ARM systems in Chapters 3 and 4, we are most
interested in providing a better solution than C-FLAT and TrackOS, while taking a more traditional
CFI approach. These two systems sacrifice some important safety-oriented security qualities of
traditional CFI to avoid interfering with real-time functionality.
2.2.5 Limitations of CFI
As we have alluded to in previous sections, CFI is not a perfect defense against control-flow hijacking
attacks. There are some vulnerabilities that depend on the implementation details. Additionally,
recent research has shown that even against fully-precise CFI with a shadow stack, certain types
of gadgets are available and can be used to completely subvert CFI.
In coarse-grained CFI, few unique labels are used in the instrumentation, and a specific indirect
branch may have many incorrect targets in its target set. It is possible that the branch may only
have one or two intended targets, but the coarse-grained policy gave it ten targets. This means
that the majority of targets should not be legal, but an attacker would be able to execute the eight
or nine unintended targets in the target set. In fact, while coarse-grained policies do decrease the
number of possible ROP gadgets, a control-flow hijacking attack is still trivial.
Dynamic CFI implementations that rely on recording control-flow events suffer from a time-of-
use to time-of-check vulnerability. Because these systems only periodically attest that the control-
flow events followed the CFG, they can allow an exploit to occur before detecting it. If an attacker
13
exploits a buffer overflow, the system will record the return to the corrupted address, and then
continue executing. Only when it runs its verification task will it detect that an illegal control-flow
event occurred. By that point, however, the damage will have been done, since the exploit already
executed.
Even with fully-precise CFI with a shadow stack, programs can be vulnerable to control-flow
bending, a type of attack that includes a new exploitation technique called printf-oriented pro-
gramming [12]. In this kind of attack, the attacker must be able to corrupt the arguments to a
function like printf. It turns out that by controlling the arguments to a format string function,
an attacker can gain Turing-complete computation without ever violating the CFG. This kind of
vulnerability can be generalized as an argument-corruptible indirect call site (ACICS) gadget [21].
By being able to control the arguments to the function being called indirectly, it is possible for an
attacker to gain arbitrary execution, especially if the ACICS gadget allows a call to system or the
exec family of functions.
2.3 Real-Time Operating Systems
Often the main purpose of an embedded system is to monitor or control physical systems. For
example, an embedded system may be controlling an electric motor in an automobile or it could
be working alongside an application processor to provide some low-level communication protocol.
In these cases, certain procedures must be performed in real-time, meaning that after an event
occurs, the processor must perform the appropriate computation by a certain deadline. There are
two kinds of real-time systems, soft real-time and hard real-time, where the former can tolerate
missing some deadlines, while the latter cannot. In hard real-time systems, a missed deadline puts
the entire system into an unknown—and often unsafe— state. To facilitate writing software with
real-time requirements, embedded system designers often use a real-time operating system (RTOS).
Depending on the processor being used, RTOSs can vary greatly in their complexity. On more
powerful hardware, like ARM Cortex-A processors, real-time processing can be facilitated by using
Linux compiled with SCHED DEADLINE or SCHED RT, which replace Linux’s Completely Fair Scheduler
(CFS) with real-time schedulers. On processors designed for embedded use, like the Cortex-R4F
used for this work, the hardware often fails to meet the minimum requirements for Linux. For
reference, in 2014, a minimally configured Linux kernel still required at least 8 MB of program
flash and 1.6MB of RAM [22], which clearly will not work on our 1.25 MB of flash and 192 KB
of RAM. The alternative to real-time Linux is using an embedded RTOS such as FreeRTOS,
VxWorks, or µC/OS, which are designed to run on devices with storage space and memory on the
scale of kilobytes, rather than megabytes or gigabytes.
In an embedded RTOS, processes are referred to as tasks. Tasks are most similar to a system
service or daemon in a general purpose operating system; they generally do not exit and they
execute periodically, often sleeping until they are signalled to do some work. Depending on the
RTOS, there are different ways that the OS can schedule tasks. Often there is some flexibility
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in choosing the type of scheduling; the most significant option being choosing between preemptive
and nonpreemptive scheduling. In preemptive scheduling, the scheduler will run periodically during
a timer interrupt, allowing tasks to be switched out at any time. In nonpreemptive scheduling,
a task must willingly yield to the scheduler. The benefit of nonpreemptive scheduling is that it
makes it much easier to reason about the schedulability properties of the system. A real-time
system designer may use modeling software to prove that the system will not miss deadlines, and
it is much simpler to model the system if the scheduler only runs at deterministic points in the
application.
2.3.1 FreeRTOS
One of the most common real-time operating systems is FreeRTOS. Designed to be as minimal
as possible, this free and open source RTOS can fit in as small as 5 KB of program flash and can
fit in under 1 KB of RAM, depending on the features used [23]. FreeRTOS is highly portable,
with architecture specific ports existing for most major architectures. FreeRTOS, while minimal
in nature, provides a few rich features such as mutexes, semaphores, shared queues, and software
timers.
Tasks and Memory Layout
Tasks in FreeRTOS can be viewed as lightweight threads sharing the same address space and
heap, but separate stacks. The kernel views tasks as an array of circular doubly linked lists of
Task Control Blocks (TCBs), which each list containing all tasks of a certain priority. The TCB
for each task maintains information including the pointer to the top of its stack, priority, and
task state (ready, blocked, suspended). Optionally, this structure can include information about
synchronization objects (e.g. mutexes) in use by the task, or it could maintain tracing information,
if enabled.
At boot time, FreeRTOS only allocates a few global variables and a heap. When tasks are
created, the TCB and task stacks are allocated in the FreeRTOS heap, which is shared between all
tasks by default. Since the libc-provided alloc family of functions is not appropriate for real-time
use, FreeRTOS provides its own dynamic memory allocation scheme. While this dynamic allocation
can be used, static allocation is preferred since it is deterministic and does not require a critical
section to access the shared heap.
Porting
The majority of FreeRTOS is written in architecture independent C code, but each port to a new
architecture requires a few special files to be implemented. Since we will be discussing modifying
FreeRTOS in Chapter 4, we will briefly look at these files now. There are three files that are
required: portmacro.h, port.c, and portasm.S.
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The first file that the FreeRTOS core depends upon is a C header file called portmacro.h, which
creates the type abstractions and a few macros for architecture-specific actions like disabling and
enabling interrupts. The type abstractions include defining StackType t and BaseType t, which
represent the stack element type and word size, respectively. Additionally, this file defines some
constants like the stack growth direction and addresses of peripheral registers.
The second file is a C source file called port.c. This C file must define important procedures like
the stack initialization for a task, the real-time clock configuration, and the real-time tick interrupt.
Even within one type of processor like the Cortex-R4, different vendors may have different ways to
configure hardware peripherals.
The last file is portasm.S, which contains port-specific assembly code. Two of the most impor-
tant parts of this file (which we will be discussing modifying in Chapter 4) are the portSAVE CONTEXT
and portRESTORE CONTEXT assembly macros. The scheduler uses both of these macros to switch
context between tasks. Since this procedure requires modifying specific registers, it must be imple-
mented in assembly language rather than C.
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Chapter 3
Control-Flow Integrity on ARM Cortex-R
Before implementing a CFI scheme on an ARM-based real-time operating system, the logical first
step is creating a working CFI system on a bare metal ARM program. Since the existing ARM
implementations either require an operating system or are unable to handle both Thumb and ARM,
we implement our own instrumentation and shadow stack. The rest of this chapter outlines the
design goals, system model, threat model, and approach to our implementation. The evaluation of
our implementation is detailed in Chapter 5.
3.1 Design Goals
The main goal of any CFI scheme is to make it difficult or impossible for an attacker to achieve
arbitrary code execution. Our main design goal is to develop CFI instrumentation for the ARM
and Thumb2 instruction sets that restricts control flow to prevent arbitrary code execution. As
with previous work, we do not protect against arbitrary memory corruption vulnerabilities; rather
we focus on preventing the exploitation of code pointer corruption. Our system will focus on the
static label checks and runtime additions that CFI provides, rather than focusing on the CFG
generation aspect of CFI. While it is shown that a CFI scheme is only as secure as its CFG is
precise [12,16,21,24], we look to the literature for control flow graph generation [17,25,26], since
CFG generation is beyond the scope of this project.
Performance and resource utilization are important aspects for any security software, but they
are especially critical for embedded software. Performance overhead should be kept to a minimum,
but most importantly, performance overhead should be deterministic. Embedded devices often
have tight time constraints where guarantees about meeting these constraints are dependent on
deterministic, bounded execution time. On general purpose computers, resource utilization is often
overlooked; resources like disk space and RAM are abundant, so security software can often add
significant resource usage without much penalty. On embedded devices, however, limited code
storage and RAM means we need to take special care to minimize the additional code and runtime
memory requirements for CFI.
There have been various theoretical and practical attacks against fine-grained CFI, including
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Control Jujutsu [21] and Control-flow Bending [12]. While we recognize these attacks, we do not
attempt to prevent them. Due to differences in programming paradigms for embedded systems, we
believe that the likeliness of these attacks being possible on the majority of embedded devices is
low. We discuss this more in Section 5.3.1.
3.2 System Model
The system that we are targeting with this work is the ARM Cortex-R processor, unlike previous
work which targets the Cortex-A architecture [13,18,20]. The real-time features of the Cortex-R
mean that it does not have virtual memory, and all memory protections are limited to the MPU
hardware. Additionally, we assume that the application running on the processor can contain both
ARM and Thumb instructions, and apart from any initialization code, any processing outside of
an interrupt context is in User mode. Finally, as a requirement for CFI, at least two regions of the
MPU will be used to disable writing to executable code while also preventing execution of writeable
memory. The remaining regions can be used for any special memory protections required by CFI
(e.g. shadow stack).
3.3 Threat Model
We assume the normal threat model for CFI implementations. We assume a powerful attacker
model; without protections, the attacker can arbitrarily read and write to any memory at any time.
This means that to meet the minimum requirements for CFI, we first need to apply memory pro-
tections. After memory protections are applied, the attacker is still able to read and write arbitrary
memory at any time, but attempts to access to privileged-only memory from user mode will cause
the device to crash. Since there are only two privilege levels, any code running in privileged mode
must be critical to CFI and must not be vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. On general
purpose systems this would be near-impossible to verify since privileged (i.e kernel) code contains
millions of lines of code, but in embedded systems, these sections of code are generally small, man-
ually verifiable, and do not accept arbitrary external inputs. These sections are primarily used
for handling hardware interrupts. While we cannot entirely discount vulnerabilities in privileged
sections of code, it is much more likely that the bug causing the vulnerability would be fixed due
to faults occuring without any malicious intent.
3.4 Approach
As discussed in Section 2.2, CFI implementations have two major parts: CFG generation and binary
instrumentation. Since sound and precise CFG generation is believed to be undecideable [21], we
do not attempt to improve upon existing CFG generation algorithms such as those presented in [25,
26], and instead focus on the binary instrumentation aspect of CFI. Our binary instrumentation
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Figure 3.1: Overview of our CFI system
Figure 3.2: Overview of binary patching system
comprises two parts: static defenses and runtime defenses. The overview and workflow of this
system is shown in Figure 3.1.
3.4.1 Binary Instrumentation
One of the major design choices for this CFI implementation is the instrumentation type. There
are two options: modify the compiler and add instrumentation at compile time or patch the binary
after compilation. While the compiler-based approach would likely have better performance, the
patching approach is able to add CFI to a compiled binary without needing source code. One
benefit of being able to instrument a compiled binary is that we can retrofit security to an existing
device that may never receive updates. We chose the patching approach due to the vast numbers of
proprietary embedded systems that ship with precompiled firmware without source code available
for recompilation. An overview of our binary patcher is shown in Figure 3.2
To perform the binary instrumentation required for CFI, we use the binary patching approach.
In this approach, the main idea is to instrument instructions by replacing them with trampolines
to new code appended to the unused flash memory section. The naive version of this algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 1.
Unfortunately, real ARM machine code has some properties that make this patching more
difficult depending on the instructions being patched. There are two main cases where patching
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Algorithm 1: Patching algorithm
input : A binary B, Address to instrument Ai, target address At , instrumentation code I
output: Patched binary with added trampoline and instrumentation
1 instruction← B[Ai]; // Save binary instruction at instrumentation address
2 I← instruction+ I; // Prepend saved instruction to instrumentation
3 B[Ai]← branch to At ; // Insert branch at instrumentation address
4 B[At ]← I; // Insert instrumentation at target address
becomes more complicated. The first is when the instruction being instrumented is a 16-bit Thumb
instruction. The branch address required by the trampoline procedure has to be 32-bits, since
ARM branches are PC-relative and we need to be able to encode a large offset to the unused flash
section. The second case is when the instrumented instruction contains a PC-relative operation,
since the new location of the instruction will have a different PC value.
To show how to handle these cases, we look to following toy example. Imagine we are trying
to instrument the foo() shown in Listing 3.1. We want to instrument the function prologue, the
indirect call, and the function epilogue. Looking at the disassembly of foo() when compiled in
Thumb mode, we identify the instructions we need to instrument, shown in Listing 3.2.
Listing 3.1: C function to instrument
1 int foo(int a, int b) {
2 int (*func[2])(int, int) = {add, sub};
3 static unsigned int i = 0;
4 return func[i++ % 2](a, b);
5 }
Listing 3.2: Selected portions of disassembly for foo() function
1 0x192: push {r4, r7, lr} #
2 0x194: sub sp, 20 # Function Prologue
3 0x196: add r7, sp, 0 #
4 ...
5 0x1e6: add r3, r3, r4 #
6 0x1e8: blx r3 # Indirect Call
7 ...
8 0x1f0: mov sp, r7 #
9 0x1f2: pop {r4, r7, pc} # Function Epilogue / Return
In the function prologue, CFI requires that we push the return address to the shadow stack as
well as embed a label according to the CFG. We need to replace 6 bytes of the function to encode
both a 32-bit branch and a 16-bit label, as shown in Listing 3.3. We branch to the code shown in
Listing 3.4, which modifies the original stack push operation to remove the link register from the
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Listing 3.3: Rewritten version of foo() function
1 0x192: b.w 0x13f60 # New prologue branches to CFI section
2
3 0x196: <label> # Insert label after branch
4 ...
5 0x1e6: bl 0x13f80 # Replace indirect call and previous instruction with
6 # branch to CFI section to do label checking
7 ...
8 0x1f0: b.w 0x13f98 # New epilogue branches to CFI section
register list, pushes the link register to the shadow stack, and returns to the instruction following
the label placed in the original function prologue.
Listing 3.4: Function prologue instrumentation
1 0x13f60: push {r4, r7} # Copy instructions from original prologue, but
2 0x13f62: sub sp, 20 # remove link register from the push register list
3 0x13f64: add r7, sp, 0
4 0x13f66: push {r0} # Push r0 since we will need it
5 0x13f68: mov r0, lr # Copy link register value into r0
6 0x13f6a: svc 0 # Call ss_push from supervisor mode (system call)
7 0x13f6c: pop {r0} # Restore r0 value
8 0x13f6e: b.w 0x198 # Branch back to original function, skipping over label
Listing 3.5: Indirect call instrumentation
1 0x13f80: add r3, r3, r4 # Copy instruction from before branch
2 0x13f82: push {r0, r1} # Push r0 and r1 since we will need them
3 0x13f84: ldrh r0, [r3, 3] # Load the label (halfword) from 3 bytes after branch target
4 0x13f86: movw r1, <label> # Load the expected label into r1
5 0x13f88: cmp r0, r1 # Compare r0 and r1
6 error:
7 0x13f8a: bne error # If not equal, enter infinite loop
8 0x13f8c: pop {r0, r1} # Restore r0 and r1
9 0x13d8e: bx r3 # Perform indirect jump
The indirect jump at address 0x1e8 in Listing 3.2 is a branch-link-and-exchange instruction with
a register operand. This is a 16-bit indirect call, so we replace it and the preceding instruction with
a direct branch-and-link operation. By using the branch-and-link operation, we ensure that the
return address is copied into the link register for use by the called function. In the instrumentation
code shown in Listing 3.5, we perform a label checking operation based on the target of the indirect
call. If the labels match, we continue with the indirect call, but if not, we enter an infinite loop.
The function epilogue needs to reverse the operations done by the function prologue. Namely,
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we need to restore registers pushed to the stack previously, and we need to restore the return
address from the shadow stack. To do this, we again replace the two 16-bit instructions with a
32-bit branch instruction. In the instrumentation shown in Listing 3.6, we start by popping the
return address off the shadow stack and moving it into the link register. We then modify the
original pop instruction to remove copying of the link register into the program counter (since we
removed pushing the link register in the prologue). Finally, we return using a branch-and-exchange
to the link register.
Listing 3.6: Function epilogue instrumentation
1 0x13f98: mov sp, r7 # Perform pre-return operation that we overwrote
2 0x13f9a: push {r0} # Push r0 so we can use it for return address
3 0x13f9c: svc 1 # Call ss_pop from supervisor mode (system call)
4 0x13f9e: mov lr, r0 # Copy return value from ss_pop to link register
5 0x13fa0: pop {r0} # Restore r0
6 0x13fa2: pop {r4, r7} # Perform original pop operation, without popping into pc
7 0x13fa4: bx lr # New return instruction
To implement this instrumentation, we use the Capstone1 disassembly engine, the pyelftools2
ELF file parser, and the Keystone3 assembler. Capstone provides a powerful disassembly and
instruction decomposition framework that makes it easy to identify the registers modified by any
instruction. We search the executable for indirect branches and instructions that indirectly modify
the program counter register (such as a load multiple operation where PC is a destination register).
After enumerating the instructions that need instrumentation, we follow the simple procedure
outlined in Algorithm 1 to generate the instrumentation. Finally, we use the Keystone assembler
to compile the instrumentation code to machine code, and write the patched code to the binary
file. We follow the same procedure for function prologues, epilogues, and indirect branch targets
until we have a fully instrumented binary.
At a high level, the resulting binary follows the format shown in Figure 3.3. The code being
instrumented is in the .text section, and the instrumentation goes into a new section called .cfi,
as shown in Figure 3.4. Both of these sections are stored in flash memory, and are not modifiable
at runtime.
3.4.2 Shadow Stack
To implement a shadow stack, there are only two main requirements: a block of free memory and
a way to protect this memory from unwanted access. On ARM Cortex-R, the best way to protect
this memory is to make it inaccessible from the User processing mode, but allow read and write





Figure 3.3: Input and output of the binary patching
program
Figure 3.4: Connection between the new .text sec-
tion and the .cfi section
system call interface using the ARM Supervisor call (svc) instruction.
The Supervisor call instruction takes one operand, an immediate value representing the function
number. When it executes, the svc instruction triggers an interrupt on the processor. The handler
for this interrupt must determine the function number by reading the opcode of the software
interrupt instruction. The ARM assembly code function to do this is shown in Listing 3.7.
Listing 3.7: Supervisor call handler
1 do_syscall:
2 stmfd sp!, {r9,r10,r12,lr} # Store registers
3 mrs r9, spsr # Move SPSR into general purpose register
4 tst r9, 0x20 # Occurred in Thumb state
5 ldrneh r9, [lr, -2] # Yes: load halfword and
6 bicne r9, r9, 0xFF00 # extract function number field.
7 ldreq r9, [lr, -4] # No: load word and
8 biceq r9, r9, 0xFF000000 # extract function number field.
9 # r9 now contains SWI number
10 cmp r9, 2 # Range check
11 ldr r 10, table # Load address of table
12 ldrls pc, [r10, r9, lsl 2] # Jump to the appropriate routine.








The actual shadow stack implementation is simple. We declare an array of bytes, ensuring that
it is aligned to the size of an MPU region. For our reference implementation, we use a 256 byte
shadow stack. The C definition of the shadow stack is shown in Listing 3.8. Upon system startup,
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the MPU is configured to make the shadow stack readable and writeable by privileged code, and
not accessible at all by User mode code. Additionally, the shadow stack is set non-executable, like
the rest of RAM. Shadow stack operations require a system call to switch to Supervisor mode,
which is the mode for handling a software interrupt exception. Depending on the function required,
we either perform a simple stack push or stack pop operation, and return to user mode. The short
ARM assembly code functions for the shadow stack operations are shown in Listing 3.9.
Listing 3.8: Shadow stack type definition






7 volatile shadow_stack *current_ss;
Listing 3.9: Shadow stack operations
1 # Input: r0 containing value to push to shadow stack
2 # Returns: void
3 .type ss_push, %function
4 ss_push:
5 ldr r9, current_ss_const # Load current shadow stack pointer
6 ldr r10, [r9] # Load shadow stack top
7 stmfd r10!, {r0} # Push r0 to shadow stack
8 str r10, [r9] # Store new top of shadow stack
9 exit_syscall # Syscall exit macro
10
11 # Input: void
12 # Returns: value at top of shadow stack -> r0
13 .type ss_pop, %function
14 ss_pop:
15 ldr r9, current_ss_const # Load current shadow stack pointer
16 ldr r10, [r9] # Load shadow stack top
17 ldmfd r10!, {r0} # Pop from shadow stack to r0
18 str r10, [r9] # Store new shadow stack top
19 exit_syscall # Syscall exit macro
20
21 # Constant pointer reference to current_ss
22 current_ss_const .word current_ss
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Chapter 4
CFI Integration into FreeRTOS
With a working CFI implementation for bare-metal ARM processors, we change our focus to inte-
grating this instrumentation into an embedded application running FreeRTOS. With FreeRTOS,
we now have an added complication: multiple threads running in the same address space with no
isolation. The remainder of this chapter outlines the design goals, system model, threat model, and
approach for integrating CFI into FreeRTOS. The evaluation for this system will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
4.1 Design Goals
The design goals for CFI integration into the FreeRTOS operating system are essentially the same
as those discussed for the bare metal implementation in Section 3.1. The main difference between
the bare metal version and FreeRTOS is context switching and multithreading. This means that we
can no longer assume that CFI checks are atomic operations, introducing the possibility of a time-
of-check to time-of-use vulnerability. In the original bare metal implementation, CFI labels were
loaded from memory into registers, and the label checking operation never stored any critical data
in memory. Based on our threat model, this meant that an attacker could not tamper with the CFI
check itself. In the presence of context switching, however, registers with CFI critical information
(the two registers with labels and the register storing the branch target) could be stored in memory
at any point during the CFI check.
Given this new vulnerability, the main goal of this CFI implementation is to prevent the time-
of-check to time-of-use vulnerability by making CFI checks appear to be atomic. The easiest way
to do this is to disable interrupts during CFI checks, but the additional latency for real-time tasks
is undesirable. Instead, we leverage the limited available memory protections to ensure that saved
context is safe from corruption.
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4.2 System Model
Like the design goals for this system, the system model remains mostly unchanged from the bare
metal model in Section 3.2. The hardware remains the same, but we now assume that the software
contains a real-time operating system, adding multithreading with no address space isolation be-
tween threads. We are still working on an ARM Cortex-R processor with mixed ARM and Thumb2
instructions. In terms of privileged execution, we assume that tasks run in User mode, while the
scheduler runs in IRQ mode, one of the privileged modes.
4.3 Threat Model
The threat model for the FreeRTOS CFI implementation is the same as discussed in Section 3.3. The
attacker has arbitrary read and write access to the memory at any time. Now that context switching
is within the system model, this gives the attacker a powerful attack against the unchanged bare
metal implementation. As mentioned in Section 4.1, a time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerability in
CFI checks is now exploitable under this attacker model.
4.4 Approach
The challenge with integrating our single-threaded, bare metal ARM implementation into an RTOS
like FreeRTOS is that we now have multiple processes running in the same address space. Each
process, or task as they are called in FreeRTOS, has its own stack, but there is no isolation
preventing one task from writing to another task’s stack at runtime. There is a FreeRTOS port
that uses the MPU to prevent this, but it incurs a lot of overhead for context switching. The
FreeRTOS-MPU port essentially makes it so that when a task is running, it can only read and
write to its own stack. This makes it difficult to have shared resources between threads in common
multithreaded programming paradigms, like shared queues with producer and consumer threads.
We feel that this isolation scheme places too many restrictions on the way that FreeRTOS
tasks can behave, so we take a slightly more permissive approach to creating isolation. While our
approach will allow tasks to write to another task’s stack, it will not allow overwriting a task’s
saved context. The main intuition behind this is that forward-edge CFI and the shadow stack
will prevent any control-flow exploit from executing in every case except when a task has been
switched out during a CFI check. If this happens, the registers being used for the check will be
saved into unprotected memory, allowing a well-timed exploit to overwrite the memory containing
the CFI check registers. With this vulnerability, the attacker could overwrite the register containing
the label or the register containing the indirect branch target. This time-of-check to time-of-use
vulnerability is a common race condition in multithreaded programs, and the traditional CFI threat
model does not take this into account.
One solution would be to disable interrupts during the CFI checks, but there are two reasons
why this is not ideal. First, disabling interrupts and enabling interrupts both require an instruction.
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Making CFI checks have to execute two more instructions adds overhead and increases the space
required for instrumentation. The second reason is that any time interrupts are disabled, we are
introducing a new source of latency for real-time tasks. Even in non-preemptive systems (where
the scheduler only runs when a task willingly yields), other real-time sensitive hardware interrupts
could be negatively affected by disabling interrupts frequently.
As an alternative to disabling interrupts during every CFI check, we propose storing the saved
context in the task’s shadow stack, rather than on the unprotected regular stack. The scheduler
already runs in privileged mode with interrupts disabled, so we do not incur additional overhead
from the Supervisor call instruction. To do this, FreeRTOS needs to be modified to support multiple
shadow stacks, which means modifying the Task Control Block (TCB) structure, the task creation
procedure, and the scheduler.
4.4.1 Shadow Stacks
Before modifying FreeRTOS to add a shadow stack to each task, we need to statically allocate a
block of memory to use for the shadow stacks. The C definitions and declarations are shown in
Listing 4.1. By statically allocating the memory and aligning it to the size of a shadow stack, we
can more easily use the MPU to protect the region, since all regions must be aligned to the size of
the region. The shadow stack operations have not changed from those shown in Listing 3.9.
Listing 4.1: C type definition and declaration for multiple shadow stacks





6 uint32_t words[SS_SIZE_WORDS * NUM_TASKS] __attribute__ ((aligned (SS_SIZE_BYTES * NUM_TASKS)));
7 } shadow_stack_data;
8
9 // For use by the FreeRTOS task creation procedure
10 StackType_t next_ss = 0;
11 StackType_t (*ss_data_arr)[SS_SIZE_WORDS] = shadow_stack_data.ss_data.ss_data_arr;
12 shadow_stack *ss_arr = shadow_stack_data.ss_data.ss_arr;
13
14 // For MPU initialization
15 const void *ss_data_block = (void*)&(shadow_stack_data);
16 const StackType_t ss_data_size = sizeof(shadow_stack_data);
17
18 // To keep track of the current shadow stack
19 volatile shadow_stack *current_ss;
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4.4.2 FreeRTOS Tasks
With a block of memory allocated for the shadow stacks, we need to modify the FreeRTOS task
creation procedure to assign a shadow stack to each task when it is created. To do this, we have
to modify the Task Control Block (TCB) structure to add a field for a shadow stack. The relevant
portions of the TCB defintion are shown in Listing 4.2.
With the data structure in place, we modify the functions that intiialize this structure, the
FreeRTOS function prvInitialiseNewTask and the port-specific FreeRTOS function pxPortIni-
tialiseStack. All that prvInitialiseNewTask has to do is assign the next available shadow stack
to the TCB of the newly created task. The port-specific pxPortInitialiseStack function is a bit
more complicated. When FreeRTOS creates a task, it sets up the stack such that the task appears
to have been switched out by the scheduler. This is an optimization that allows FreeRTOS to
simply use its restore context routine to start a task, rather than needing a special procedure.
For ARM devices, the stack initialization routine needs to emulate having pushed the relevant
registers to the stack, as well as a few variables that FreeRTOS depends upon for each task. We
modify this procedure to put all of the registers in the shadow stack, since we do not want any
saved context to be vulnerable to malicious modification.
Listing 4.2: FreeRTOS Task Control Block definition
1 typedef struct tskTaskControlBlock
2 {
3 volatile StackType_t *pxTopOfStack;






10 typedef tskTCB TCB_t;
4.4.3 Context Switching
With support for shadow stacks added to task creation, the only part left is to modify the sched-
uler to use the shadow stack. Normally, the scheduler saves context for each task on the task’s
unprotected stack. Instead, the scheduler needs to save context to the protected shadow stack.
Most of the scheduler is written in ARM assembly, and the instruction set makes it easy to save
context to the unprotected stack. Normally, to save the register information to the stack from the
scheduler, only two instructions are needed: srs and push. The srs mnemonic is the store return
state instruction, which pushes the IRQ return address and the saved process state register to the
system or user mode stack (see Section 2.1.2 for more information regarding processing modes).
After saving the return state, the scheduler switches to system mode and pushes the rest of the
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registers to the stack. To modify this to use the shadow stack, we need to get the pointer to the top
of the shadow stack, and use this like the stack pointer. The full code for the context saving routine
is shown in Listing 4.3, and the full code for the context restoring routing is shown in Listing 4.4.
Listing 4.3: FreeRTOS save context routine with shadow stack
1 .macro portSAVE_CONTEXT:
2 dsb # Data synchronization barrier
3 isb # Instruction synchronization barrier
4 # Store registers in the shadow stack
5 push {r0, r1, r2} # Save temp registers
6 ldr r0, current_ss_const # Load location of current shadow stack into r0
7 ldr r0, [r0]
8 ldr r1, [r0] # Load shadow stack top into r1
9 mrs r2, spsr # Load saved process status register (SPSR) into r2
10 stmfd r1!, {r2} # Push SPSR to shadow stack
11 stmfd r1!, {lr} # Push LR to shadow stack
12 stmfd r1, {r3-r12, lr}ˆ # Push user/system mode registers onto shadow stack
13 sub r1, r1, 44 # Manually decrement shadow stack top
14 mov r3, r0 # Now that r3-r12 are saved, we can use r3 and r4
15 mov r4, r1 # to point to the shadow stack to finish saving context
16 pop {r0, r1, r2} # Restore temp registers
17 stmfd r4!, {r0-r2} # Push r0-r2 to the shadow stack
18 str r4, [r3] # Store the new top of shadow stack
19 # The rest of the context information is stored on the system mode stack
20 cps SYS_MODE # Switch to system mode
21 ldr r2, ulCriticalNestingConst # Load critical nesting count
22 ldr r1, [r2]
23 push {r1} # Store critical nesting count on system mode stack
24 ldr r2, ulPortTaskHasFPUContextConst
25 ldr r3, [r2]
26 cmp r3, 0 # Check if task uses floating point
27 fmrxne r1, fpscr # Get floating point status/control register, if used
28 vpushne {d0-d15} # Save floating point registers, if used
29 pushne {r1} # Save fpscr, if used
30 push {r3} # Save whether task has floating point context
31 ldr r0, pxCurrentTCBConst # Get location of stack pointer in TCB
32 ldr r1, [r0]
33 str sp, [r1] # Save new top of stack
34 .endm
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Listing 4.4: FreeRTOS restore context routine with shadow stack
1 .macro portRESTORE_CONTEXT:
2 # Restore context information from system mode stack
3 ldr r0, pxCurrentTCBConst # Get top of stack
4 ldr r1, [r0]
5 ldr sp, [r1] # Load task stack pointer
6 ldr r0, ulPortTaskHasFPUContextConst
7 pop {r1}
8 str r1, [r0]
9 cmp r1, 0 # Check if task uses floating point
10 popne {r0} # Restore floating point, if needed
11 vpopne {d0-d15} # Restore floating point registers, if needed
12 vmsrne fpscr, r0 # Restore fpscr, if needed
13 ldr r0, ulCriticalNestingConst
14 pop {r1}
15 str r1, [r0] # Restore the critical section nesting depth.
16 # Restore registers from the shadow stack
17 ldr r11, current_ss_const # Load current shadow stack
18 ldr r11, [r11]
19 ldr r12, [r11]
20 ldmfd r12!, {r0-r10} # Pop r0-r10 off shadow stack
21 push {r0, r1, r2} # Save r0-r2 for use as temporary values
22 mov r0, r11 # Copy shadow stack top and address
23 mov r1, r12 # into new temp registers
24 ldmfd r1!, {r11-r12, lr} # Restore the rest of the registers
25 add r2, r1, 8 # Get shadow stack top address +8
26 str r2, [r0] # Store new shadow stack top
27 mov r12, r1 # Copy previous shadow stack top to IP
28 pop {r0, r1, r2} # Restore temporary registers
29 dsb # Data synchronization barrier
30 isb # Instruction synchronization barrier
31 rfefd r12 # Return from exception using shadow stack




As with any security technique, we expect a trade-off between performance and security, where
better security generally results in higher performance overhead. Our CFI implementation follows
this model. In this chapter, we first discuss the security of our instrumentation, showing that the
instrumentation will enforce CFI policy, even in the presence of a powerful attacker. Then, in two
parts, we discuss the performance overhead our CFI instrumentation introduces. Specifically, we
evaluate the raw overhead for bare metal ARM CFI using the CoreMark embedded CPU benchmark,
and we explore the potential adverse effects of latency in FreeRTOS after introducing CFI. Finally,
we end with a discussion of the limitations of our system, and we highlight some of the directions
that future work could take to improve this system.
5.1 Security Evaluation
Unfortunately, measuring the security benefits of a proposed CFI scheme is difficult to describe
quantitatively. Measurements that have been used in the past include ROP gadget reduction and
average indirect target reduction (AIR) [16]. While Carlini et al. have discussed how these measure-
ments are misleading, they provide no alternative quantitative measurement of the effectiveness of
a CFI system [12]. Additionally, these measurements try to quantify precision of CFG generation
alforithms, which was not a focus for our work. Instead of AIR, Carlini et al. propose a Basic
Exploitation Test (BET), where a minimal, representative program is written with a common vul-
nerability (such as a buffer overflow) to show that a CFI scheme prevents an attacker from achieving
a specific goal [12].
5.1.1 Basic Exploitation Test (BET)
When evaluating the security of CFI schemes, the quantitative measurements used in the literature
do not quantify security—they quantify the precision of the control-flow graph. Often the actual
instrumentation is overlooked; how do we know that the instrumentation itself is not exploitable?
To find out, we abstract away the CFG, and assume we have a labeling scheme that meets the
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assumptions for CFI. Then, we perform a Basic Exploitation Test (BET). Given a set of small,
vulnerable programs that cover the scenarios that our instrumentation is supposed to protect, we
examine the program from the attacker’s point of view. The threat model states that the attacker
can read or write arbitrary memory at any time. Realistically, the attacker can read or write
memory only when exploiting some memory corruption vulnerability, which means the memory
access will occur at the current privilege level. Given this realistic attacker model, we examine the
instrumentation to ensure two invariants:
1. At every forward-edge indirect branch, the only branch that can occur is a branch to a target
with the matching label.
2. Every function call returns to the instruction following the calling instruction.
Before examining the actual instrumentation, we look at the attacker’s capabilities with memory
protections in place. The ARM MPU ensures that memory is writeable or executable, but not both.
Additionally, the MPU makes the shadow stack accessible only to privileged mode execution. So,
the attacker can read or write to any address in RAM, unless access is privileged-only, in which
case the attacker needs to be able to exploit a memory corruption vulnerability while the processor
is in privileged mode. Interrupt handlers execute in privileged mode, which unfortunately means
that a vulnerable interrupt handler could subvert this CFI scheme. But, since interrupt handlers
in real-time systems are designed to be short and deterministic, we will assume that they cannot
read or write arbitrary memory during their execution. While this assumption may not hold true
for every case, we depend on it for the protection of user mode tasks.
Forward-edge Instrumentation Without Context Switching
Each forward-edge check has two parts: the source and destination instrumentation. The source
instrumentation replaces the indirect branch and its preceding instruction with a direct branch to
the correct location in the .cfi section. The general format of the indirect call instrumentation is
shown in Listing 5.1. In the .cfi section, the instrumentation starts with the preceding instruction,
fixing up addresses if necessary. From there, it saves the two registers required for the forward-edge
label check, loads the label from the source and destination into those registers, and compares
them. If the labels match, the two registers used for the check are restored and the indirect branch
is taken. Otherwise, the execution enters an infinite loop.
By inspecting each of the instructions used here, we can see that the critical part of the CFI
check is performed entirely in registers. The source label is hardcoded in a mov instruction, so that
cannot be modified. The target label is either in program code, or it is in RAM. If it is in program
code, it must be a legal target. If it is in RAM, the CFI check will allow the branch to be taken,
but the MPU will prevent the processor from executing the code at the target. There are three
possible outcomes from the label checking code: the branch is taken and execution continues, the
branch is taken and the MPU prevents execution, or execution enters an infinite loop. In any of
the three cases, the attacker cannot achieve arbitrary execution.
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Listing 5.1: General format of indirect call instrumentation
1 <previous_instruction>
2 push {r0, r1} # Save temporary registers
3 ldrh r0, [<target_reg>, <label_offset>] # Load label from target
4 movw r1, <label> # Move expected label into register
5 cmp r0, r1 # Compare target vs expected
6 error:
7 bne error # If label mismatch, infinite loop
8 pop {r0, r1} # Restore temporary registers
9 bx <target_reg> # Perform indirect branch
The destination is instrumented by replacing the first three instructions with a direct branch
to another location in the .cfi section and a label. The direct branch simply points to a copy of
the function prologue with the shadow stack code (which we will examine later in this section) and
a branch back to the instruction following the label. As long as the label is stored in unmodifiable
program code, there is no way to exploit the target instrumentation.
Forward-edge Instrumentation With Context Switching
The only time that the CFI checks can be tampered with is when context switching is possible. If
the scheduler interrupts the CFI check and puts CFI-critical registers into memory, our threat model
dictates that the attacker could use this as an opportunity to corrupt the CFI-critical registers.
When context is restored, the corrupted values will be loaded into the registers, potentially allowing
the attacker to bypass CFI. As stated in Section 4.4.3, we combat this by storing all saved context
in the shadow stack.
Since the scheduler runs with interrupts disabled, the scheduler operations are essentially atomic
operations. This means that there is no opportunity for an attacker to corrupt the context before
it gets pushed to the protected shadow stack. The other possible attack vector would be to change
the pointer to a task’s shadow stack. Luckily, it is easy enough to simply protect the entire Task
Control Block with another MPU region or just verify that the shadow stack pointer lies within
the protected region of memory.
Backward-edge Instrumentation With Shadow Stack
Like each forward-edge check, each backward-edge check also has two parts: function prologue and
function epilogue instrumentation. In ARM, we are not concerned with the backward-edge in leaf
functions, that is, functions at the end of a call tree that do not call any other functions. Leaf
functions do not push the return address to the stack; they keep the return address in LR and end
the function with a bx lr instruction. In non-leaf functions, however, the compiler will generate a
matching pair of push {<reglist>, lr} and pop {<reglist>, pc} instructions. These are the
functions that we need to instrument.
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Listing 5.2: Function prologue and epilogue instrumentation
1 # Prologue instrumentation
2 push {<reglist w/o lr>} # original push without LR
3 <next_instruction> # Instruction following the push, if overwritten by label
4 push {r0} # Push r0 since it will contain argument to ss_push
5 mov r0, lr # Copy link register value into r0
6 svc 0 # Call ss_push from supervisor mode (system call)
7 pop {r0} # Restore r0 value
8 b.w <original_function + 6> # Branch back to original function, skipping over label
9
10 # Epilogue instrumentation
11 <previous_instruction> # Perform pre-return operation that we overwrote
12 push {r0} # Push r0 so we can use it for return address
13 svc 1 # Call ss_pop from supervisor mode (system call)
14 mov lr, r0 # Copy return value from ss_pop to link register
15 pop {r0} # Restore r0
16 pop {<reglist w/o pc>} # Perform original pop operation, without popping into pc
17 bx lr # New return instruction
The instrumentation for non-leaf functions has a single goal—protect the return address by
saving LR in the shadow stack rather than the unprotected stack. The general form for the
instrumentation is shown in Listing 5.2. The software interrupt (svc) instruction changes the
processing mode from User to Supervisor mode, allowing us to modify the shadow stack. The
shadow stack code runs with interrupts disabled, so the shadow stack operation itself is assumed
to be atomic. All other calculation is performed in registers, so the attacker cannot modify LR
without a context switch. If a context switch occurs, we push all of the context to the shadow stack
anyways, so there is no time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerability.
5.2 Performance Impact
Like any CFI scheme, there is performance overhead associated with adding this instrumentation.
To measure the performance impact, we look at three different measurements. First, we use an
embedded system benchmark to determine the overhead associated with the bare metal instrumen-
tation. Second, we look at the additional latency added to FreeRTOS context switching by adding
the shadow stack. Finally, we analyze the resource requirements for this CFI scheme.
5.2.1 CPU Benchmarks
Since this CFI scheme is designed to work on embedded systems without a full operating system,
we are unable to measure overhead using the industry standard SPEC CPU2006 benchmark. To
measure the raw overhead associated with CFI checks on a realistic workload, we look to the
CoreMark embedded system benchmark [27]. This easily portable application runs on a variety
34
Figure 5.1: CoreMark results with and without CFI. Default settings, 1000 iterations
of embedded architectures without an operating system. It performs various common embedded
tasks, like matrix manipulation, linked list manipulation, state machine operations, and cyclic
redundancy check (CRC) calculation.
On our TI RM46L852 evaluation board, we measured the CoreMark score both with and without
CFI. Without CFI, the recorded CoreMark score was 97.371, which is a reasonable score for that
hardware running in Thumb mode. With CFI, we recorded a score of 76.767, a decrease of about
21% compared to the non-CFI score. Additionally, we recorded an approximately 30% increase in
total execution time for the benchmark code. These results are shown graphically in Figure 5.1.
5.2.2 FreeRTOS Performance
When measuring the overhead due to CFI on FreeRTOS, using the embedded benchmark is not
enough. While the benchmark may give us a general amount of overhead for single-threaded
processing, we are more concerned with the multi-threaded performance. In particular, we need to
know CFI’s effect on latency. If we assume that we have a schedulable system where all deadlines
are met without CFI, how much latency must the tasks be able to tolerate for CFI not to break
the real-time guarantees?
First, we identify the sources of latency. CFI label checks and shadow stack operations increase
the worst-case runtime of a task. The new worst-case runtime scales linearly with the number of
indirect branches and non-leaf functions in the task. Shadow stack operations and the scheduler
operate with interrupts disabled. Any time that interrupts are disabled, the latency for handling
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Figure 5.2: Latency (in number of instructions) of CFI critical sections in FreeRTOS with two running tasks
interrupts and context switching is increased. If adding forward-edge CFI checks to a system does
not break the schedulability of the system, the only other sources of latency relate to the shadow
stack. Particularly, the shadow stack instrumentation and the new context switching operation
add latency of the system. The additional latency added by shadow stack operations is shown in
Figure 5.2. The latency added by ss push and ss pop is exactly 15 instructions. The exact runtime
for this depends on caching and instruction execution time, but this can vary from processor to
processor. In the scheduler, we add 20 instructions, which is not an unreasonable amount of
additional processing compared to the 567 instructions in the worst-case execution of the scheduler
with two tasks in the system. In general, the worst-case execution of the scheduler without CFI is
(167 + 188n) instructions, where n is the number of tasks in the system, excluding the idle task.
5.2.3 Additional Resource Use
Since this CFI scheme is designed to run on embedded systems with constrained resources, addi-
tional resource use is important to measure. Specifically, we report code storage size requirements,
RAM usage requirements, and hardware peripheral usage. In cases where our scheme may cause
an existing binary to exceed the limits provided by the hardware, more expensive hardware may
be necessary.
In its current state, our system requires an additional 10 bytes of storage per indirect branch
and 12 bytes per non-leaf function prologue and epilogue. While we cannot generalize the number
of non-leaf functions and indirect branches in any given program, the CoreMark benchmark (a 10
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KB binary) required 964 bytes of instrumentation code. This is just under a 10% increase in binary
size.
As for RAM usage, it depends on the system being instrumented. On bare metal systems, a
single shadow stack is required, which on our evaluation system, we used a shadow stack size of 256
bytes plus 12 bytes for the shadow stack structure—a total of 268 additional bytes of RAM for the
shadow stack. In FreeRTOS, however, we used a larger shadow stack, since context information is
stored on the stack. So we required 528 bytes per task, which encompassed a 512 bytes shadow
stack, 12 byte shadow stack structure, and 4 byte pointer to the shadow stack stored in each Task
Control Block.
Finally, our implementation depends on some additional resources. We need at least two MPU
regions to prevent execution from RAM and to protect the shadow stack. On our hardware, a
maximum of 12 regions could be configured, so our utilization was minimal. Also, we require two
supervisor calls out of a possible 256 available in Thumb mode.
5.3 Discussion
With these results, we can see that while this system appears to provide many security benefits at
the expense of moderate performance and low resource overhead, there are still some limitations
that should be addressed. The major limitation, inherent to CFI itself, is CFG generation. A
limitation specific to our work is our dependence on privileged execution, where we assume that all
privileged execution is secure.
5.3.1 Limitations
All security measures have limitations; this CFI scheme is no different. Some of the limitations
are inherent to CFI, while others are specific to this implementation. Limitations inherent to CFI
include CFG precision and the maximum security benefits of the static forward-edge checks. Our
implementation has some additional limitations, especially when concerned with processing modes
in ARM.
It is well-documented that CFI schemes can only be as secure as the CFG is precise [12,16,21,24].
There are two sources of imprecision: the difficulty of sound and complete CFG generation and
the labeling scheme extracted from the CFG. Sound and complete CFG generation is believed to
be undecidable [12,21], so to preserve functionality of programs, CFI schemes often use a more
permissive CFG, potentially allowing some unintended indirect branch targets. On top of the
inherent imprecision, the labeling scheme itself often introduces more imprecision for performance
reasons. To reduce overhead, most CFI schemes, including this one, assigns one label to an indirect
jump and its targets. Unfortunately, this means that if two sources share a target, they need to
use the same label. For example, if Source 1 can target A or B, and Source 2 can target B or C,
the labeling scheme would allow Source 1 to target C, even though that edge was clearly not in
the CFG. This imprecision can allow an attacker to achieve Turing-complete computation in the
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presence of certain instruction sequences [12,21]. We do not attempt to remove this imprecision,
but we do believe that due to smaller executable size and differences in programming techniques
for embedded systems, this imprecision is less likely to be exploitable.
One of the major limitations in our work is the dependence on ARM processing modes. Since
there are only two available privilege levels on ARM Cortex-R, we make a potentially unrealistic
assumption about privileged mode execution. We assume that all privileged execution cannot be
exploited. While good embedded software design will keep privileged sections short, deterministic,
and easily verifiable, there is no guarantee that all existing applications were built this way. If
there is a vulnerable privileged section of code, the attacker can modify the shadow stack, allowing
corruption of return addresses or CFI context, essentially rendering CFI useless. One way to
prevent this would be to prohibit all writes to the shadow stack except during privileged shadow
stack operations. To do this, we have to use ARM MPU coprocessor instructions to change the
shadow stack region permissions at the beginning and end of every shadow stack operation. This
would limit the shadow stack corruption attack surface, requiring the attacker to be able to execute
MPU instructions to disable the MPU before he can corrupt the shadow stack. However, this would
result in significant overhead, nearly doubling the amount of instructions needed for each shadow
stack operation. The new ARMv8-R architecture may have a better way to handle this vulnerability
with its bare metal hypervisor mode, but these processors are not widely available yet, and existing
systems with ARMv7-R processors will likely not be upgraded.
5.3.2 Future Work
Apart from addressing the limitations mentioned previously, there are some other directions that
future work could take. One of the major areas that this work and other CFI work could benefit from
is a better analysis of the security guarantees provided by CFI. Another possible topic for future
work is a more in-depth analysis of the effects of security measures like CFI on real-time systems.
Finally, the prototype system created for this work can likely be optimized for performance.
Previous work has suggested AIR [16], ROP gadget reduction [16], and the Basic Exploitation
Test (BET) [12] as ways to evaluate the security of CFI-based systems. Unfortunately, AIR and
ROP gadget reduction are misleading metrics, especially in the context of embedded systems where
it may only take one malicious indirect jump to cause catastrophic failure. The BET, while a good
sanity check for CFI instrumentation, is prone to human error and would be better if performed
by some formal analysis. Future work could focus on modeling CFI systems and proving their
correctness with formal methods, rather than human analysis.
In our evaluation, we briefly discussed CFI’s effect on the latency of real-time tasks. While this
analysis is helpful, it is limited in scope without real-life applications to test against. Unfortunately,
very few embedded applications are open source and freely available, so it is difficult to make
generalizations about our scheme’s effect on schedulability in real systems. Future work could
focus on modeling FreeRTOS with and without CFI, such that a more formal schedulability analysis
would be possible with easily tunable parameters.
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Our instrumentation required hand written ARM assembly code. While we focused on making
the instrumentation as fast as possible given the binary patching approach, there are likely some
optimizations that could be made within the scheduler, CFI checks, and shadow stack operations.
One of the most useful optimizations would be reserving registers for use only by CFI, preventing
the need to save registers needed for labels and the shadow stack. This approach may not be
possible with binary patching, but it is possible with a compiler-based CFI scheme.
Finally, the new ARMv8-R architecture adds a bare-metal hypervisor mode with a new privilege
level and faster MPU operations. Future ARM Cortex-R CFI implementations could take advantage
of this functionality to perform faster CFI checks with better guarantees on security, since the
hypervisor privilege level could be used exclusively for shadow stack operations, meaning we would




In this thesis, we described a reference implementation for control-flow integrity on ARM systems.
In this implementation, we show how we can use hardware features of embedded ARM processors
to meet the various requirements for CFI, specifically the write-exclusive-or-execute assumption
and the protected shadow stack. To instrument ARM binaries, we created a binary patching tool
that can be used to retrofit CFI to precompiled binaries without needing source code. Finally,
we extended this implementation to the FreeRTOS real-time operating system, which introduces
multi-threading without process isolation. To prevent time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerabilities,
we modified the FreeRTOS operating system to isolate saved context from running threads. With
these modifications in place, we were able to apply the CFI technique to embedded applications
using real-time operating systems.
To the best of our knowledge, our instrumentation itself is secure against exploitation as long as
there is no privileged-mode code in the system that have memory corruption vulnerabilities. The
FreeRTOS shadow stack implementation provides enough process isolation for CFI assumptions to
met, and could even be used without CFI just to protect saved context from malicious corruption.
We found that our CFI scheme had moderate overhead on bare metal ARM benchmarks. In
the CoreMark embedded benchmark, we saw a 21% decrease in score, which corresponded to a
30% increase in execution time. Although we saw a moderate increase in execution time, we had a
minimal increase in program size, requiring just under 10% more code storage than the unprotected
binary. For FreeRTOS, we measured the new worst-case latency introduced by CFI. We found that
despite adding 20 instructions to the scheduler, the worst-case execution path in the scheduler was
already over 500 instructions long in a system running only two tasks.
While this work makes a significant step towards hardening real-time embedded systems, there
are many directions that future work could take. Beyond just optimizing our existing work, we
would like to have a way to use formal methods to prove correctness of CFI instrumentation, which
means we need a way to model CFI schemes and hardware architectures to show that the CFI
scheme maintains the expected invariants. Additionally, in the embedded systems space, we would
like to be able to model CFI in a way that allows us to perform a more formal schedulability
analysis for real-time tasks. Finally, the new ARMv8-R architecture provides promising features
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